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Introduction
In this paper we examine how wages for politicians should be determined. If politicians in office provide public goods, remunerations should ensure that the most competent citizen runs for office, and will be elected at minimum wage costs. We consider two cases. The public can either determine in advance how much an elected politician will earn, or politicians can propose their own wage during campaigns.
We consider a highly stylized citizen-as-candidate model, where an elected politician undertakes policy projects for a society. Candidates may differ in competence, and wages for politicians are financed by taxes. Our main insights are as follows. First, as a rule, the competence of elected candidates is equal or higher when the public determines wages optimally than when remuneration is self-designed by candidates. Second, social welfare is normally lower in the case of competitive wage offers by candidates than in the case of predetermined remuneration. Competition bids up wages beyond the level required for an efficient selection of politicians, since competing candidates do not sufficiently internalize the externalities their wage proposals create for the public and the other candidate.
The current analysis draws on three strands in the literature. First, incentive elements in politics, other than elections, have been discussed in Gersbach (2001) and Gersbach (2003) where the value of holding office in the second term is made dependent on the realization of macroeconomic variables in that term. This increases the incentive for politicians to undertake socially desirable policies with long-term consequences in the first term. Politicians are allowed to offer their own long-term wage contracts during campaigns.
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By contrast, in this paper we consider the competition of politicians for wages and office in a single term in the context of a citizen-as-candidate set-up. While the above literature suggests that contract competition between politicians is welfareimproving, our current paper provides a counterexample. We show that politicians should not be allowed to offer their own remuneration schemes for the next term.
Second, candidates holding office will provide a public good. Thus, we may face the standard free-riding and underprovision problem when public goods are privately supplied. This problem is discussed e.g. in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) , Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) , Güth and Hellwig (1986) and recently Hellwig (2001) . In our model, the public can overcome the underprovision problem by setting wages or by allowing politicians to offer wage schemes.
Third, we use a version of the citizen-as-candidate model, as developed by Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997) . In such settings, citizens who consider running for office must take into account the private costs incurred by running for office, benefits from policies they would like to undertake, and benefits from policies other potential candidates are likely to implement.
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This paper is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the model. We then examine fixed wages set by the public. In section 4 we identify equilibria in cases where politicians can propose their remuneration. Section 5 contains the welfare comparison.
In section 6, we examine the robustness of the results and identify conditions under which our results are reversed. Section 7 concludes.
The Model
We consider a society with N voters who have to elect a politician who undertakes policy projects for all members of the group. There are two potential candidates, i = 1, 2, for this job. The remaining N − 2 individuals cannot be candidates and only act as voters.
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Candidates differ in their competence: candidate i (i = 1, 2) can generate a net benefit b i > 0 for every member of the society due to his policies. We label candidates in such a way that b 1 ≥ b 2 . We assume that the benefits candidates 2 Messner and Polborn (2003) have also examined the role of wages in citizen-as-candidate models and have developed a new model of this kind. They do not focus on the comparison between remuneration set by the public and self-designed wages. 3 We assume that N is greater than 4, and thus that there are more voters who do not seek office than there are candidates.
can generate for each member of the society are observable.
For each candidate i, there is an individual cost c i incurred by standing for election and serving in office. This cost includes the opportunity cost of seeking office and any gains from being in office. If the latter source of utility is more important, we have c i < 0. c i is assumed to be perfectly observable by the voters. The elected politician receives a wage that is financed by distortionary taxation, which is levied on all other members of the society. Let λ > 0 denote the shadow cost of public funds. That is, taxation uses (1 + λ) of tax payers' resources in order to levy 1 unit of resources for paying wages to candidates in office. The utility of candidate i if he is elected is
and the utility of any other member of the society is
If no potential candidate is willing to run, then a default policy will be implemented that yields a benefit of b 0 = 0 for every voter. If only one candidate runs for office, then he automatically assumes power.
We examine two scenarios. In the first scenario, we discuss how voters would determine the wages for politicians. The timing in the first scenario is as follows:
Stage 1: Voters decide about the level of the politician's wage denoted by W .
Stage 2:
The candidates decide simultaneously whether to run for office or not. 
Fixed Wages
We first consider fixed wages. We neglect equilibria in weakly dominated strategies and obtain our first result.
Proposition 1
There exists an equilibrium for stages 2 and 3 that depends on the wage level in the following way:
then both candidates run for office and candidate 1 is elected.
• If W ≥ c 2 − b 2 and
then candidate 2 runs for office and is elected.
• 
and thus if his utility from holding office is higher than the utility when candidate 2 governs. The condition can be transformed into
Proposition 1 indicates that higher wages can attract the more competent politician to run for office. 4 We will later determine optimal wage levels the public should set for the political race.
Competition for Wage Contracts
In this section we explore what happens if candidates can offer to perform political duties for a certain wage. After the candidates have proposed their remuneration scheme, the voters elect the candidate who creates the highest utility for them. Thus, the timing is as follows:
Stage 1 : Each candidate proposes a remuneration scheme W i .
Stage 2:
The voters elect one of the two candidates
The wage offers of W 1 and W 2 are common knowledge for voters. Note that we can neglect the decision of candidates to run for office, since they can propose arbitrarily high wages. We first observe that candidate 1 is elected if
Now we will look at the equilibrium in which candidate 1 is elected.
Proposition 2
If (1 + λ)(c 1 − c 2 ) ≤ (N + λ)(b 1 − b 2 ), there
exists an equilibrium in which candidate
1 is elected with wage offers that satisfy:
The proof is given in the appendix. An important feature of Proposition 2 is that wages are indeterminate, i.e., there are infinitely many combinations of pairs (
that can constitute an equilibrium. As a corollary we obtain:
Then there exists an equilibrium in which candidate 1 is elected with minimal wages
given by:
There also exists an equilibrium in which candidate 1 is elected with maximal wages
The reason for the multiplicity of equilibria can be summarized as follows. 
The proof of Proposition 3 follows the lines of the proof of Proposition 2, and is therefore omitted. As a corollary we obtain: given by:
There also exists an equilibrium in which candidate 2 is elected with maximal wages
Corollary 2 is the mirror image of Corollary 1. Again, there is a continuum of pairs (W 1 , W 2 ) that can constitute an equilibrium.
Welfare Comparisons for c 2 = 0
In this section we provide welfare comparisons for the case c 2 = 0 to illustrate potential drawbacks of competitively offered wage schemes by politicians. We assume that the public determines the wage in the first scenario in order to maximize welfare in terms of the utilitarian welfare function. Following the logic of section 3 in the case of a fixed wage, candidate 2 will run for office for any wage W ≥ 0 because b 2 + W ≥ 0.
Candidate 1 will enter the political competition if
where we have denoted the critical wage level byW . , is given by
IfW > 0, two potentially optimal wage offers exist. The first of these wage levels is 
and is elected.
In this case candidate 2 would not deviate from a wage
As c 2 = 0, this requires W 2 = 0. Thus W 2 = 0 is the equilibrium remuneration scheme by candidate 2, and the equilibrium wage of candidate 1 is therefore given by:
In this case the overall welfare, denoted by U var , is given by:
, candidate 2 is elected with a wage W 2 which must satisfy the equilibrium boundaries. Overall welfare is simply:
In the next result, we summarize the comparison between fixed and self-designed remunerations.
Proposition 4
For 0 < λ, welfare is always higher under fixed wages than under competitive wages, and monotonically decreasing in λ.
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. Proposition 4 is our first main result. In principle, welfare can be lower because less competent candidates are elected or wage costs, and therefore tax distortions are higher. The comparisons in the proof illustrate that under competitive wage offers by candidates, realized wage costs become higher than under fixed and predetermined remunerations for politicians. The main reason is that wage competition by politicians bids up wages, because externalities for the other candidate and for all voters are not taken into account. The next proposition
shows that the competence of politicians also tends to be higher when wages are set by the public.
Proposition 5
For 0 < λ, candidate 1 is elected more often under fixed wages than under competitive wages.
The proof of Proposition 5 is given in the appendix.The next corollary shows that the costs of redistribution are essential for the preceding arguments.
Corollary 3
For λ = 0, candidate 1 is elected under fixed wages and competitive wages equally often as candidate 2. Both scenarios yield the same welfare.
The proof of Corollary 3 is given in the appendix. If there are no redistribution costs, the level of wages is irrelevant for welfare comparisons. Since for λ = 0 the same candidate is elected under fixed and self-designed wages, welfare is identical as well.
6 Welfare Comparisons. The General Case.
In this section, we examine the robustness of the argument by allowing for c 1 > 0 and , is given by
IfW > 0 andW > c 2 − b 2 , there exist two potentially optimal wage offers. The first of these wage levels is W opt = c 2 − b 2 , in which case candidate 1 would not run for office and candidate 2 would be elected. In this case, overall welfare would be given by
The second potentially optimal wage level is W opt =W . In this case, candidate 1 would run for office and would be elected with certainty. Overall welfare would be given as
=W is the optimal remuneration for
IfW > 0 andW < c 2 −b 2 , then the welfare maximizing wage under a fixed remuneration scheme is W opt =W . Candidate 1 runs for office forW and is elected with certainty.
In this case, overall welfare is given by
We turn next to compensation schemes competitively offered by the politicians. According to section 4, for
The overall welfare, denoted by U var , is given in this case by
Note that
and 
Note that
and
The preceding observations lead to the following result.
Proposition 6 The proof of Proposition 6 is given in the appendix. Proposition 6 indicates that fixed wages outperform self-designed remuneration packages as long as the size of the society is not too small, when the difference in competence outweighs the cost difference, or when the most competent candidate has lower costs when running for office. Note
It can, however, occur that welfare is higher under competitive wages than under wages determined by the public.
be elected under competitive wages, while candidate 1 is elected under fixed wages.
However, wages and tax distortions are so much higher under fixed wages that these costs outweigh the competency advantage of candidate 1.
Conclusion
Our results can be interpreted in several ways. The drawback of competitively offered wages can be understood as an argument against the general application of the dual mechanism in politics -incentive contracts and elections -as advocated by Gersbach (2003) and Gersbach (2000) . Allowing candidates to design the conditions of their term may cause excessive wage costs, or cause less competent politicians to be elected.
Nevertheless, the argument in terms of high wage costs may not be as serious as it appears to be from the model. First, wages set by the public must be tailored in such a way that the welfare-maximizing candidate runs and will be elected. Second, higher wage costs under competitively offered earning schemes may be negligible in the government budget.
For a broader perspective, the most important drawback of competitively offered remuneration packages might be less competency in politics. In addition, allowing politicians to compete with self-designed compensation packages might involve further adverse consequences. Wealthy candidates who are running for office may be able to forgo remuneration by the public completely. Accordingly, other, less wealthy candidates, may not be able to compete on equal terms in political campaigns. As we will examine in subsequent research, this might undermine a pillar of democracies that the pool of candidates for political positions should not be constrained a priori. Hence, allowing for competitively offered wages in each term does not appear to be a priority in broadening the scope of democracies.
Appendix Proof of Proposition 2
First note that in order for candidate 1 to be elected, W 1 , must satisfy
because otherwise the public is better off electing candidate 2. This follows from equation (5) . Therefore, when candidate 1 wants to be elected he offers the wage
A downward deviation can be excluded, because then candidate 1 could raise his utility by offering a higher wage and would still be elected. Deviation to a higher wage leads to the election of candidate 2.
Candidate 1 will not deviate to a higher wage than in 6, and will not leave the office to candidate 2 if
Inserting the equilibrium value of W 1 as a function of W 2 from equation (6), this condition becomes
which can be transformed into
which yields
Thus, candidate 1 will want to run for office if condition (7) is fulfilled and, hence, the proposed remuneration W 2 exceeds a certain threshold.
We next examine the optimal choice of W 2 by candidate 2. A possible deviation from the proposed equilibrium in the proposition for candidate 2 would be to offer a wage W 2 = W 2 − which would lead to his election. Candidate 2 will not choose this option
and thus if his utility from being a citizen under candidate 1 is higher than his utility from holding office himself. By inserting the equilibrium value of W 1 , as given by (6),
we obtain the condition
Therefore, if wage W 2 is small enough, candidate 2 would prefer to be a citizen under candidate 1 as opposed to running for office with a lower wage.
Therefore, there only exist values for wage offers W 2 that satisfy both conditions (8) and (7) if
and hence we obtain the assumption of the proposition given by
Proof of Proposition 4
We now examine different cases. = 0, and welfare is given by
Under a fixed wage we have
Thus, welfare is higher under the fixed wage scenario. = 0, welfare in this case is given by
Under a fixed wage, candidate 1 is elected if
this equation can be transformed into
This implies
which always holds for (
This implies that, under a fixed wage scenario, candidate 1 runs and is elected with certainty. We have welfare as
Welfare is higher under a fixed wage scenario becausẽ Under the fixed wage framework, welfare is
Hence, welfare with wages set by the public is higher than or equal to what it is under competitive wages. 
.
candidate 1 is elected. Note that candidate 2 is elected if
This implies that candidate 2 is elected more often under competition for wages than under the fixed wage scenario. Hence, under fixed wages the more competent candidate is elected more often than under competitive wages.
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Proof of Corollary 3
Case 1: SupposeW < 0. Candidate 1 is elected. Welfare under competition for wages is given by
Under a fixed wage we have For λ = 0 under the fixed wage scenario, candidate 2 is always elected, because with λ = 0 we have
Under fixed wages we obtain
Hence, fixed wages and competitive wages yield the same welfare.

Proof of Proposition 6
We now obtain five cases.
holds. Therefore, candidate 1 is elected with competition for wages, and welfare is given by
Thus, welfare under the fixed wage scenario is higher than or equal to what it is under competition for wages. 
Under a fixed wage, welfare depends on which candidate is elected. Given the assumptions of case 2, we have Under a fixed wage, candidate 1 runs for office and is elected. In this case, welfare is given by
Welfare is higher under a fixed wage (see case 2). Under the fixed wage framework and using the conditions in case 4, welfare is given by .
